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The subjects in this experiment were 200 undergraduate women enrolled in a beginning psychology course at The University of Michigan. The subjects were paired using criteria aimed at minimizing the probability that the subjects were previously acquainted. We tried not to pair subjects who lived in the same residence hall. It was impossible to follow this criterion completely, but in no pair did the subjects live on the same floor, and in only one pair did the subjects appear to have been previously acquainted. This latter pair was dropped from the analysis. One subject in each of two other pairs was familiar with the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and these two pairs were also dropped. Furthermore, the last pair was not used in the analysis in order to limit the total to 96 pairs. The reason will be mentioned presently.
The game matrix, used in a previous study (Morehous, 1964) , was as follows:
Every pair of subjects played a one-trial game, a two-trial game, a five-trial game, and a ten-trial game. In order to compensate for any effect due to the position in which the game was played, the order of the games was varied systematically. Posi Table 2 we see that, in one-and two-trial games, UNI and CC were about equal; together they formed about one-third of the subjects' responses.
Two-thirds of all responses were noncooperative.
The level of total cooperation (C) in the five-and ten-trial games is slightly above the level of bilateral defection (DD). The parametric means for five-and tentrial games are also similar to each other and different from those of the shorter games. The chi-squares in Table 2 make use of this difference, for they were calculated by a median test for significance (df = 1) using only two categories: oneand two-trial games, and five-and ten-trial The data just presented have described the overall levels of cooperation and defection and the time courses generated by the parameters, but the dynamics of this conflict situation can be analyzed even further.
To do this, we use four other parameters, x, y, z, and w (Rapoport, 1965a) . To x we assign the probability of a player's cooperating after an outcome in which both players cooperated; to y, the probability that a player will cooperate after an outcome in which he cooperated and the other player defected; to z, the probability that a player will cooperate after an outcome in which he defected and the other player cooperated ; and to w, the probability that a player will cooperate after an outcome in which both players defected. Table 5 ). This suggests again that people perceive different lengths of run in different ways.
